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process. This is evidenced by the fact that no mailing requirement exists for substituted service under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 4 New York, on the other hand, requires mailing
plus an affixation or delivery.8 5 It would seem logical to assert,
therefore, that if there was affixation or delivery, the fact that the
mailing was made to a "last known residence" at which the defendant was known not to reside would not in itself render the
entire service violative of federal due process. Rather, a violation
would arise if the notice was not "reasonably calculated" s8 to
give the defendant actual notice of the pendency of the action.
The practitioner should be encouraged in similar situations
to take advantage of the opportunities offered under CPLR
308(4) by obtaining an order for such appropriate service as
may be directed by the court. This practice would alleviate much
of the concern over potential challenges to substituted service and
instill confidence in the legal effectiveness of a chosen method
of service.
7
The court, in William Iser, Inc. v. Garnett,"
stated that
failure to file proof of service made under CPLR 308(3) does not
divest the court of jurisdiction."
Under the CPA, some confusion existed as to whether a
failure to file within twenty days constituted an incurable jurisdictional defect s9 Since the CPLR eliminated this time limit, it is
an indication that the legislature did not consider a failure to
file to be a jurisdictional defect."" The defendant's attorney,
therefore, should proceed bearing in mind that the requirement
of filing must be met only to set the time within which the defendant
must answer.
CPLR 308(4):

Court ordered serice.

91

In Dobkin v. Chapman, plaintiff was injured in New York
City when struck by an automobile owned and operated by Pennsylvania defendants. Personal service under CPLR 308(1), authorized by CPLR 313, proved unsuccessful. The same result occurred under Section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. U18

4 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
85 CPLR 308(3).
88 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

8746 Misc. 2d 450, 259 N.Y.S2d 996 (Sup. Ct Nassau County
1965).
88William Iser, Inc. v. Garnett, 46 Misc. 2d 450, 451, 259 N.Y.S2d
996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
89 CPA § 231 provided that proof of substituted service must be filed
within 20 days after the order for such service was granted. See, e.g.,
Toubin v. White, 2 Misc. 2d 723, 151 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
9o Supra note 87, at 452, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
9146 Misc. 2d 260, 259 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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timately, plaintiff procured a CPLR 308(4) court order providing
for service by ordinary mail. The court held that service by
mail was permissible under CPLR 313 when read, as it must be,
in conjunction with CPLR 308.
In utilizing CPLR 308(4), however, the practitioner should
bear in mind the fact that due process requirements must be
satisfied. Court-ordered service which technically satisfies the New
York statute may be set aside for failure to fulfill federal due
In order to assure the constitutionality
process requirements. 2
of service, an order for publication as well as ordinary mail
should be requested.
It should be noted that a request for court-ordered service
by ordinary mail does not conflict with the "nail and mail' provisions of paragraph (3). In addition to a mailing under paragraph (4), such as the one in the instant case, paragraph (3)
requires that the summons be nailed to the actual abode, place
of business or dwelling. Hence, such an order as this is not an
illegitimate bypassing of paragraph (3).
The problem of strict compliance with all the requirements of
court-ordered service under CPLR 308(4)13 was treated in Sellars
v. Raye. 94 The defendant contended that if the Vehicle and
Traffic Law 95 required a plaintiff to obtain a return receipt for
the service mailed, and, if the court ordered service "within the
ambit" 98 of this statute, then, upon failure to obtain such a receipt,
the court could not sanction service by an order allowing publication
in its place. The court, rejecting this contention, held that the
method chosen for service under CPLR 308(4) was within its
power and discretion, and stated that "service . . . accomplished
in two stages pursuant to two separate orders does not render
it invalid." 97
Acknowledging that CPLR 308(4) can be employed only
"where it would be futile to attempt service" 9 by another paragraph,
a court, in approving the suggested method of counsel, should not
be obligated to conform it to some existing non-CPLR procedure,
which could also result in a "futile" attempt. Rather, the court
may select from among various statutory and non-statutory sug92

See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).

93 "Personal service upon a natural person shall be made
4. in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs,
if service is impracticable under paragraph one, two or three of this
section."
94 45 Misc. 2d 859, 258 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
95

N.Y. VEHICLE & TRA.ic LAW §§ 253, 254.
DOSellars v. Raye, 45 Misc. 2d 859, 258 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (Sup.
Nassau County 1965).
971d.
at 862, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
9
FFTHr REP. 266.
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gestions those which will form one means "reasonably calculated" 99
to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the action.
CPLR 314(1):

Expanding in rem ba-ses.

In Chittenden v. Chittenden,0 0 an action to have a Mexican
divorce decree declared invalid, the supreme court held that
service by publication could be made under CPLR 314(1)101 upon
a non-resident who married the plaintiff's alleged husband following
such decree.
The practitioner should note that the expanded concept of
interest in the marital res found in the CPA 102 has been carried
Since the plaintiff was a New York
over into the CPLR.
resident, this state undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the res. The
husband and the wife are usually the parties deemed to have an
interest in the marital res. However, it is submitted that the
holding in Chittenden is in accord with the liberal spirit of the
CPLR,0 3 and is realistic under the facts of the case. Since a
declaration of the invalidity of the Mexican divorce decree would
re-establish the validity of the first marriage, thereby rendering
the second marriage invalid, the defendant does have a very real
interest in the marital res.
CPLR 320(c):

Amendment.

Prior to 1965, CPLR 320(c) provided that any appearance
of a defendant served without the state under CPLR 314 conferred
personal jurisdiction unless an objection to jurisdiction was asserted
under CPLR 3211(a) at the time of appearance. As a result
of the phrase "at the time of appearance," a conflict existed between
CPLR 320(c) and CPLR 3211(e) since the latter offers the option
of objecting by motion or answer irrespective of whether an appearance has been made. The legislature in 1965 deleted this
phrase and the conflict no longer exists.
The result is that a defendant can serve a notice of appearance
without fear that he thereby forfeits his jurisdictional objection.
As long as he is able thereafter to make a CPLR 3211 motion,
he may, in that latter motion, include his jurisdictional objection.
However, the practitioner should be aware of the danger of waiving
90 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940,).
Ct. Monroe County 1965).
101 "Service may be made without the state by any person authorized by
section 313 in the same manner as service is made within the state:
1. in a matrimonial action
"2 CPA § 232.
103 CPLR 104.
10046 Misc. 2d 347, 259 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup.

